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Abstract 
The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well 
established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of 
demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in 
the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive 
relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that the cushioning of banks 
downside risks provide the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and design 
compensation packages to deliver high returns. Macro-prudential regulation will have 
a better chance of curbing excess risk taking than controlling banker’s compensation. 
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1.     Introduction 
 
Politicians, journalists, Nobel-prize winners and now even royalty have pronounced 
on the great banker’s bonus debate. The popular view is that bonuses have encouraged 
bankers to take risky positions with the aim of making short-term profits. By ignoring 
the risks bankers have, at the very least, contributed to the making of the great 
recession, if not having actually caused it. In recent months there have been a 
proliferation of reports commissioned, regulations published and rhetoric spouted as 
politicians and regulators have attempted to convince a hostile public that they are 
taking the initiative toward curbing the perceived excesses that have led to the current 
crisis. Principles of regulations concerning banker’s pay have been pronounced by the 
G20. The regulatory authorities from New York, London, Paris and even Hong Kong 
have announced forthcoming regulations. By controlling bonuses and compensation, 
it is believed that regulation can reduce excessive risk taking and return the banks to a 
nether age of ‘boring banking’. 
 This paper argues that banker’s bonuses are an effect and not a cause of 
excessive risk taking by the banks. In the parlance of economic modelling, both 
compensation and risk taking are endogenous variables. The driving factor is the 
widespread expectation that banks in the UK are ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF). There is 
ample evidence of an association between compensation and risk taking activity. We 
suggest that this association is not a causative one. We proceed by reviewing the 
evidence for an association between banker’s compensation and risk taking. Second, 
we outline the proposals by regulatory agencies for controlling banker’s 
compensation. Third, we examine the issue of TBTF and the policies used to deal 
with it. The period of deregulation in the 1980s was not followed up with sufficient 
re-regulation to restrain the development of a TBTF expectation. Finally, we conclude 
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with an examination of the implications of regulating banker’s compensation as part 
of a general countercyclical regulatory policy. 
 
2.  Banker’s Compensation 
The total of bonus payments to Wall Street and City of London bankers have been the 
subject of much comment in recent months. The scale of the total payouts are an 
insight to the rewards earned by select investment bankers. Estimates produced by the 
media tend to give an average figure, obtained by dividing the bonus pot by the 
number of employees to give a misleading figure which underestimates the true pay-
out to bonus recipients. For example research done by the Wall Street Journal claims 
that average earnings at J P Morgan Chase will be $134 thousand in 2009, while 
average pay at Goldman Sachs is expected to be $743 thousand1. In reality, recipients 
of large bonuses can expect them in the order of millions. Table 1 show that bonuses 
in Wall Street and the City of London are heading for a strong recovery in 2009. 
 
Table 1: Total bonus payouts 
Year Wall Street Bonuses 
$ billion 
City of London Bonuses 
£ billion 
2001 13.0 3.9 
2002 9.8 3.3 
2003 15.8 4.9 
2004 18.6 5.7 
2005 20.5 7.1 
2006 23.9 10.1 
2007 33.2 10.2 
2008 18.4 4.0 
2009 27.5 (estimated) 6.0 (estimated) 
Source: New York State Comptroller Office, London and the City 
Prospects, Wall Street Journal estimates and Centre for Economic & 
Business Research estimates. 
                                                 
1 Quoted in the Guardian Newspaper 14 October 2009 
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The background to banker’s compensation is steeped in the principal agent 
problem of aligning the agents (managers) behaviour with that of the principals 
(shareholder) objectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980). The conventional 
view is that agents want job-security and are naturally risk-averse and therefore need 
incentives to undertake risky projects that add value to the firm. These incentives take 
the form of direct compensation such as salary and cash bonus and firm-related 
wealth enhancing compensation such as increase in the value of option holdings, 
increase in value of restricted stocks, profits from exercising options and increase in 
value of direct equity holdings. The firm-related wealth enhancing compensation 
schemes (stock options) are assumed to create better alignment of agent’s behaviour 
with principal’s preferences. However, as Berrone (2008) suggests stock options and 
similar instruments provide upside rewards if share prices rise but no downside 
penalties if they fall. Consequently, the incentive is to take ‘excessive risks’. The 
implication of the principal agent theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others2 is 
that if top management reward is closely aligned the equity holder’s interests in 
highly leveraged firms like banks, there will be a strong incentive to undertake high 
risk incentives3.  
In their recent survey of manager incentive mechanisms in banking, Panetta et 
al (2009), list a number of unintended consequences of remuneration packages. 
Remuneration packages based on accounting profit may result in CEOs and senior 
executives taking decisions that boost short-term profits at the expense long-term 
growth. Pay is based on immediate gains that are based on risky investments. These 
immediate gains are interpreted as managerial skill. Ex-post risk adjusted returns may 
show over-estimated alpha (returns to managerial skill) and underestimated beta 
                                                 
2 John and John (1993) 
3 It can also be argued that the political leverage of a large firm can also result in a lower pay-
performance sensitivity see Jensen and Murphy (1990)   
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(systematic risk). Typically, these values are not known until after the remuneration 
has been activated. It also creates an incentive for risk managers to be overruled by 
senior executives. 
The hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of bank CEO 
compensation is sensitive to a measure of risk was tested by John and Qian (2003) 
and Brewer et al (2003).  Both studies find a positive association between a measure 
of risk (volatility of share value) and equity-based compensation. These findings are 
indicative of an established a positive relationship between risk and pay-offs to CEOs 
of banks. Regulators can use this as argument for paying attention to the 
compensation schemes of CEOs and senior executives.  
John and Qian (2003) study the pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs in US 
banks over 1992-2000. They find that the pay-performance sensitivity of bankers is 
lower than that of other firms and that this sensitivity declines further with the size of 
the bank. They find that lower equity-asset ratios lead to CEOs aligning their interests 
with shareholders at the expense of depositors by taking excessive risks4.   
Studies of hedge fund manager behaviour show that contrarian strategies are 
avoided if the bonus system does not compensate for risk taking behaviour. 
Brunnermeir and Nagel (2004) show that weak bonus schemes lead to herd behaviour 
in bubble situations because fund managers are not rewarded sufficiently for taking 
contrarian views that incur short-term losses, therefore herding is a rational strategy.  
The implication of this finding is that strong bonuses that reward risk taking 
behaviour will incentivise contrarian behaviour which would have driven the market 
back to fundamentals. This is precisely the findings of Dass et al (2008) for mutual 
fund managers. Because mutual fund managers face longer-term incentive schemes 
                                                 
4 The size of the bank will also result in a low pay-performance sensitivity because of an implicit or 
explicit Too-big-toFail policy as predicted by Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
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than hedge fund managers, they found that bonus-based mutual fund managers 
contributed to correction of the market when experiencing speculative bubbles. The 
incentive effects of bonuses on effort, risk-taking and attention to fundamentals is 
examined in survey work conducted by Gehrig et al (2009). Bonuses were not the 
main factor in determining work effort in German and Swiss fund managers but in the 
USA where bonuses are typically higher they have positive effects on effort, risk 
taking and fundamentals orientation5.  
It is clear that the empirical evidence supports the presumption that bonus 
payments incentivise bankers and fund managers. The relationship with risk-taking 
depends on the structure of the compensation scheme. Compensation schemes that 
reward risk-taking are associated greater risk-taking which should not be a surprise. 
What may be a surprise is that the literature survey conducted by Panetta et al (2009) 
finds abundant evidence of the link between risk-taking and CEO option based 
compensation schemes but no evidence of excessive risk taking. However, none of the 
empirical findings shed any light on the argument that compensation schemes and 
risk-taking are both endogenous variables determined by an unknown factor. Recently 
published work by Phillipon and Reshef (2009) provide some insight into what this 
unknown factor might be. 
In an NBER paper Phillipon and Reshef (2009) estimate the compensation 
premium of earnings in the US financial sector from 1909 to 2006. The premium is 
measured as the wage in the financial industry relative to average non farm wage. 
They show that 83% of the variation in the relative compensation premium is 
explained by deregulation. Figure 3 below reproduces the movement in excess 
                                                 
5 A preliminary study of bank CEO compensation in China by Ding, Schenk and Song (2007) found a 
low pay-performance sensitivity and compensation being made up of cash and short-term performance 
bonuses. Pay-performance sensitivity in Chinese banks is much lower than its US counterparts as 
would be the actual levels of compensation.  
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compensation. The figure shows that the compensation premium rose rapidly during 
the 1920s and even survived the great depression of the 1930s. The premium 
remained low during most of the 1950s through to the 1970s coinciding with the 
period of the post-war regulation (restrictions on interstate banking, divorce of 
commercial from investment banking). The premium began to climb again in the 
1980s, coinciding with the abolition of regulation Q and climbed rapidly during the 
deregulation period of the 1980s and 90s.  
Figure 3: Excess Wage Compensation in US Financial Sector 
 
Source: Phillipon and Resheff (2009) 
The period of deregulation coincided with two further but mutually dependent forces 
of financial innovation and globalisation. Around the world but particularly in the 
liberalising economies, banks faced intense competitive pressure from incumbent 
banks, foreign banks, non-bank financial institutions and even non-financial 
institutions. Faced with thinning spreads and declining net interest margins, the banks 
controlled costs through technological innovation, consolidation and merger. They 
also shifted their focus to off-balance sheet business and securitization as a means of 
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generating profits6. It was not long before the ‘originate and hold’ model gave way to 
the ‘originate to distribute’ model as a means of boosting return on equity (ROE).  
 
3.    Regulatory proposals 
Reaction by governments and regulators to the crisis has been swift and efforts 
concerted as banks that, only months ago were dependent on state hand-outs to stay 
afloat, have returned to profit and begun to set aside large bonus pools to be 
distributed amongst their employees.  At recent G-20 meetings world leaders pledged 
to crack down on excessive risk taking by banks, forcing them to tie bonuses to long-
term performance in addition to raising the proportion of capital they are required to 
hold.  A draft communiqué from the meetings revealed that leaders plan to tell banks 
to avoid “multi-year guaranteed bonuses” and allow pay awards to be deferred or 
clawed back, though more draconian French proposals to introduce specific caps on 
pay were rejected.  The growing influence of emerging economies and recognition 
that global solutions are necessary in an age of global banking was also marked by the 
agreement that the G-20 would supplant the G-8 as guardian of the world economy. 
Independently, each country and its financial regulators have also been 
working hard to develop new rules to curb the banks excesses. With a general election 
looming, the UK has been quick to respond to the issue of banker bonuses and the 
country’s City watchdog, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) recently published 
guidelines on remuneration practices in financial services7. The Remuneration Code, 
which will take effect from January 1, 2010 will apply to 26 of the largest banks, 
                                                 
6 In a study of the competitiveness of the British banking industry, Matthews et al (2007) find that 
while competition in the loan and deposit market was undiminished during the 80s and 90s, 
competitiveness worsened in the non-interest earning area of bank activity,  
7 Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (Remuneration Code) Instrument 2009 
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building societies and broker-dealers in the UK and represents the first set of major 
market rules to reform banker pay in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
In drafting the code the FSA adopted their modus operandi since 2006, 
providing “principles-based” regulation as opposed to a list of detailed and specific 
rules. As well as a legally enforceable “general requirement” that firms “must 
establish implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that 
are consistent with and promote effective risk management” they are also expected to 
take heed of a series of 8 “evidential provision” principles which deal with topics 
ranging from the composition of a firm’s remuneration committee, to the assessment 
of financial performance used to calculate bonus pools. The FSA has clarified that the 
evidential provisions of the Code are “not per se compulsory”, but that non-
compliance with them “tends to show non-compliance with the Remuneration Code 
[enforceable] general requirement”.  
Reaction to the Code has been mixed, with much of the media dismissing its 
provisions as “toothless”. Many were left disappointed that the Code’s stricter 
requirements, outlined in its draft version, had been removed following consultation 
with the banks; for instance, the draft included a requirement that senior executives be 
required to take two-thirds of their bonuses over three years, while the final version 
simply suggests it as good practice. 
The FSA’s reluctance to impose strict, non-negotiable rules on the banks has 
been the source of many commentators’ frustrations. However, laying down the law 
with a list of stringent rules would have been the regulatory equivalent of using a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut – likely resulting in the unintended stifling of both 
innovation and risk-taking. Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that general 
principles-based regulation actually results in more enforcement action than reducing 
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policy to simple hard-and-fast rules, for example, since the FSA’s switchover to 
principles based regulation in 2006 the number of sanctions it has imposed on 
individuals has roughly doubled. Talented lawyers are employed by banks and 
financial institutions to find ways in which to circumvent complex and onerous rules, 
where a system is based on principles however, avoidance becomes far more difficult.  
Finally, operating with the knowledge that its actions are being closely scrutinised by 
the public and facing the threat of extinction if the UK Conservative Party take power 
at the next election, it seems unlikely that the FSA will hesitate in bringing 
enforcement action against firms who demonstrate flagrant disregard for the 
remuneration principles outlined in the Code when it comes into force next year. 
 Hot on the heels of the UK regulator the US Federal Reserve announced 
proposed incentive compensation guidance on October 22nd8. The guidance includes 
two supervisory initiatives. The first, applicable to 28 large, complex banking 
organisations (LCBOs), will review each firm's policies and practices to determine 
their consistency with the principles for risk-appropriate incentive compensation. The 
second will review compensation practices at regional, community, and other banking 
organisations not classified as large and complex as part of the regular, risk-focused 
examination process. As with the FSA's Remuneration Code, the Fed's proposed 
guidance rests on a series of principles, namely, ensuring balanced risk-taking 
incentives, compatibility with effective controls and risk management and having 
strong and effective corporate governance. The Fed will also have the power to take 
enforcement action against a banking organisation if it believes it is engaged in unsafe 
or unsound practices which go against these guiding principles. 
                                                 
8 Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 206, Tuesday, October 27, 2009 - [Docket No. OP-1374] Proposed 
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies 
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 Although the FSA's Remuneration Code and the Fed's guidance are both 
examples of principles-based regulation, on closer inspection the UK regime appears 
to be far more prescriptive in nature. For example the FSA's evidential provisions 
relating to the role of bodies responsible for remuneration policies is far more specific 
(setting out detailed guidance on the acceptable size, composition and expertise of a 
remuneration committee) than the Fed's general proposals relating to ensuring 
effective controls and risk management. At a basic level, the Federal Reserves' 
proposals simply require LCBOs to demonstrate their pay schemes do not encourage 
excessive risk taking while the FSA rules require banks to demonstrate how they have 
adapted their policies and procedures to comply with its evidential principles. It is a 
difference that has not escaped the banking executives who only days after the Fed's 
proposals were published were reported as being concerned that the differences in 
flexibility of the systems could lead to a two-tier system, in which UK banker's 
bonuses are smaller and spread over a longer period than those of American 
colleagues9. 
  Bankers are like highly mobile capital and should differences in systems of 
regulation result in lower compensation packages being paid to bank employees 
working in London as opposed to Wall Street the talent will likely migrate and 
London's competitive position will be left compromised.  There is also the potential 
for the UK's competitive advantages to be further eroded as institutions seek to 
relocate to countries with less stringent regulatory regimes, such as Switzerland, 
whose banking regulators have thus far proved unwilling to wade into the bonus 
quagmire.10 However whatever the levels of regulation, many of the larger banks will 
                                                 
9 ‘Wall street fears two-tier pay scale after heavy-handed FSA action’ Financial Times, 30 October 
2009 
10 Although some hedge funds have shown a willingness to relocate, the predicted exodus of banks and 
financial institutions from London to countries with lighter touch regulation, such as Switzerland has, 
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still need to maintain operations in major financial centres such as London and New 
York and as discussions at the G-20 indicate the UK and US will not be the only 
major economies putting significant controls on remuneration policies over the 
coming months – nor, if French and German proposals to place caps on pay are 
implemented are they likely to be the most restrictive. 
 
4.      Too-big-too-Fail and the regulatory imperative 
With the growth of earnings in the banking sector came a greater concentration 
through merger and acquisition. This was particularly the case with the UK banking 
industry but globally there was a trend to consolidation and concentration. One 
measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) defined 
as; ∑
=
=
n
i
iSHHI
1
2 , where Si is the ith bank’s share of the market. Figure 4 below shows 
the evolution of the HHI statistic for the UK banking industry over the 1980s and 
90s11.  A number of high profile mergers and acquisitions occurred in the UK banking 
industry at the turn of the century. Barclays acquired Woolwich, Bank Santander 
acquired Abbey National, Royal Bank of Scotland acquired Nat West, Halifax and 
Bank of Scotland merged to create HBOS. It is clear that in recent years the HHI 
index shows an industry that under recommended regulatory precepts would be 
considered anti-competitive. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
so far, largely not materialised. Consulting firm Kinetic Partners LLP stated in October 2009 that it had 
helped 23 hedge-funds make the move from London to Switzerland in the preceding 18 months. There 
were 957 single-manager hedge funds in the U.K. at the end of 2008, according to figures from 
industry publication EuroHedge. 
11 According to the current screening guidelines of the US Department of Justice, the banking industry 
is regarded as competitive if HHI is less than 1000, somewhat concentrated if HHI lies between 1000 
and 1800, and highly concentrated if HHI is larger than 1800. 
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Figure 4: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for UK banking   
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With the growth and concentration of the banking sector also comes the 
expectation that banks are too big to fail. The problem of TBTF is the familiar one of 
moral hazard. A government sponsored safety net may prevent bank panics but the 
bad news is that it creates moral hazard which is even more severe for large banks 
because when they fail it can lead to a systemic risk that infects the whole banking 
system. Knowing that downside-risks are cushioned by the safety net of TBTF, only 
upside rewards enter the cost calculation of the bank leading to excessive risk taking. 
It is fair to say that the doctrine of TBTF has evolved into an accepted part of the 
architecture of financial systems in all countries and regulators have attempted to deal 
with it through capital adequacy requirements and PCA.  
Clearly, TBTF imposes externalities on society in the form of fiscal costs of 
bank bailouts. A credible no bail out policy would remove these costs but under a 
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pure free banking system capital-asset ratios would be in excess of the Basle 
minimum12. However, the protection of depositors and the payment mechanism from 
a systemic bank failure makes the no-bailout policy unsustainable. The issue arises 
because of a lack of credibility of the policy maker’s commitment to not bail out large 
banks. A no-bail-out policy is not time consistent because of the failure of the policy-
maker to credibly pre-commit. The existence of TBTF increases the risk taking of 
banks which increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. One way of thinking about 
the TBTF problem is to apply the cost-benefit calculus of Barro and Gordon (1983) to 
the issue of time inconsistency. Policies that reduce the externalities from the failure 
of a large bank on the financial system reduce the incentive to renege on a no bailout 
pledge. 
If explicit or implicit deposit insurance, and protection of the payments system 
is a political imperative that weakens the resolve of the government or regulatory 
authority to sustain a no-bailout policy, Benston and Kaufman (1996) suggest that 
regulation should:  
a) Prohibit activities that are considered excessively risky 
b) Monitor and control the risky activities of banks 
c) Require banks to hold more capital sufficient to absorb potential losses. 
Regulating bank bonuses by shifting the focus towards medium term rewards may 
result in a marginal shift away from risky activity but in the presence of the safety net 
good employment lawyers would find ways for the banks to reward and retain good 
personnel. In general the first two suggestions by Benston and Kaufman (1996) would 
be over-prescriptive as different banks operating in different markets have better 
information about risks than the regulator (Llewellyn, 2003). The last suggestion is 
                                                 
12 At the turn of the 20th century US banks had capital ratios in excess of 20% and in the mid 19th  
century they were in excess of 40% (Matthews and Thompson 2008) 
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the one in practice that regulators can effectively monitor. Counter-cyclical capital 
requirements are in vogue. In their recent report in financial stability Brunnermeier et 
al (2009) state: 
“Banker’s remuneration has incorporated insufficient internalizing of the social costs 
of excessive lending. But we aim to deal with this through our additional capital 
charges. The response of banks to less profit in the boom should be smaller bonuses, 
so there will be less need for regulators to meddle in the overall level of 
remuneration.” P.50   
 
But a belt-and-braces approach to regulation however, would recognise that 
countercyclical capital requirements alone would be insufficient without addressing 
the larger picture of TBTF. One mechanism for dealing with the problem of TBTF is 
to borrow from the analysis of the conservative central banker of Rogoff (1985). Is it 
possible to appoint an independent but conservative regulator that puts a greater 
weight on the moral hazard costs of bank bailouts than the government? This is an 
attractive option but like the conclusion of Rogoff (1985) the optimal degree of 
commitment would be to not be ‘too conservative’. Hence some weight would be 
given to maintaining a TBTF policy but not a zero weight.  
But how can the no-bailout policy be made credible, particularly since the 
conservative regulator is not to be too conservative? Once again we can borrow from 
the economics of central banking by designing incentive compatible contracts in the 
sense of Walsh (1995). The independent conservative regulator will have an incentive 
compatible contract that will penalise him or her for failure to exercise prompt 
corrective action. Formulating an incentive contract for regulatory reaction is not easy 
but some way towards it is the adoption of more rules based regulation13. An 
example is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 1991, which 
links the intensity of supervision to the capitalisation of the banks in the form of a 
                                                 
13 Brunnermeir et al (2009). 
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ladder of graduated response, i.e. instead of annual audit by the regulator, the audits 
can occur several times in the year according to the results of the last audit.  
A novel suggestion by Mishkin (2006) is that the regulatory agency makes an 
announcement that the first large bank to fail will not be treated as TBTF and costs 
will be imposed on uninsured depositors when the bank is closed14. The advantage of 
this approach is that uninsured depositors, creditors and stock holders have an 
incentive to monitor the bank because they worry that they would be the first bank to 
fail and not be bailed out. Similarly managers would not want to be the only bank that 
fails and is not bailed out and so by trying not to be the first bank to fail the complete 
system is preserved.  
The incentive structure needs also to be extended from the regulators to the 
banking system. For example a prudently run bank would want to signal its practice to 
the regulators. They would adopt best practice as recommended by national banking 
associations, international bodies, Basel II etc. This would reduce the frequency of 
on-site regulatory intrusion. Such a relationship between the regulator and the bank 
would be on-going and not one-shot. Satisfactory internal controls result in lower on-
site inspections. The Financial Services Authority in the UK is supposed to apply a 
risk rating to each bank on a 1-5 scale. The Bank of England suggests a combination 
of risk measures and qualitative indicators of organisation, management, culture 
including bonus schemes be incorporated into a risk metric ranging form 1 to 10.     
The bank may also offer a contract to the regulator pre-committing the 
enforcement of internal controls and that banking book and trading loses wouldn’t 
exceed a certain percent of assets as per the use of Value-at-Risk measures. To be 
credible, such a contract would have to be ex-post verifiable by the regulator. 
                                                 
14 One can only surmise the signal  the bail out of Bear Stearns sent Wall Street. 
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 Clearly a regulatory authority that builds up a reputation for tough supervision 
will influence expectations of prompt corrective action PCA but like Rogoff’s 
conservative central banker we would not expect the regulator to be ‘too conservative’ 
and regulatory forbearance would not disappear. The purpose of creating a tough 
regulatory environment with rules based regulation and appropriate incentive 
compatible contracts for the regulator and the regulated is to minimise the risks that 
arise from TBTF. 
 
5.    Conclusion 
Tinkering with the compensation packages of senior bankers at the very best will have 
marginal effects on the balance of risky and safe investments and at the worst could 
stifle innovation and risk taking. Worse still will be the negative microeconomic 
effects of skilled labour misallocation if bonus regulation is not internationally 
coordinated.  
Countercyclical capital requirements could in principle alter the risk activity of 
bankers and at the same time limit the bonuses of bankers. However, not addressing 
the bigger picture of the implicit TBTF policy leaves open the possibility for 
regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation to circumvent costly capital 
requirements. Addressing an implicit TBTF guarantee through a credible no-bail-out 
policy requires rules based regulations and strong prompt corrective action. Recently 
commentators have re-stated the call for a Tobin type narrow banking framework or 
return to a version of the Glass-Steagall act. Both policies would be a retrograde step 
from the trend in universal banking, would be unpopular with banks and would be 
unnecessary. Breaking up banks is an appropriate strategy on competition grounds but 
credible no-bail-out policies to address the implicit TBTF guarantee is what is needed 
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for financial stability. Controls on banker’s bonuses make good media copy and vote-
catching policies but do little to improve financial stability.  
 19
References 
Barro R and Gordon D (1983), ‘Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of 
Monetary Policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101-121 
 
Benston G J and Kaufman G G (1996), The appropriate role of bank regulation’, 
Economic Journal, 106, 688-697  
 
Berrone P (2008), ‘Current global financial crisis: An incentive problem’, IESE 
Business School, Occasional paper OP-158 
 
Brewer III E, Curt-Hunter W, Jackson III W (2003), ‘Deregulation and the 
relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking’, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, Working Paper, 32 
 
Brunnermeir M, Crockett A, Goodhart C, Persaud A D, Shin Hyun (2009), The 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy, 11, Geneva and London: ICMB and CEPR 
 
Brunnermeir M and Nagel S (2004), ‘Hedge funds and the technology bubble’, 
Journal of Finance, 59 2013-2040 
  
Dass N, Mass M and Patgiri R (2008), ‘Mutual funds and bubbles: The surprising role 
of contractual incentives’ Review of Financial Studies, 21, 1, 51-99 
 
Ding D, Schenk H and Song F (2006), ‘An exploratory study of executive 
compensation in Chinese banking’, Paper for presentation at the All China 
Economics Conference, Hong Kong, 12-14 December 2007  
 
Fama E F (1980), ‘Agency problems and the theory of the firm’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 288-298 
 
Gehrig T, Lütje and Menkhoff (2009), ‘Bonus payments and fund managers’ 
behaviour: Transatlantic evidence’, CEPR Discussion Paper, 7118 
 
Goodhart C, Hartman P, Llewellyn D, Rojas-Suárez L and Weisbrod S (1998), 
Financial Regulation, London: Routledge 
 
Jensen M C and Murphy K J (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives’, Journal of Political Economy, 98, (2), 225-64 
 
Jensen M C and Meckling W (1976), ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360  
 
John T and John K. (1993), ‘Top-Management compensation and capital structure’. 
Journal of Finance, 48, 3, 949-974 
  
John K and Qian K (2003), ‘Incentive features in CEO compensation in the banking 
industry’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, April, 109-
122 
 20
Llewellyn D T (2003), ‘Some lessons for bank regulation from recent financial crises’ 
in A W Mullineux and V Murinde (eds), Handbook of International Banking, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Matthews K and Thompson J (2008), The Economics of Banking, Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd 
 
Matthews K, Murinde V and Zhao T (2007), ‘Competitive conditions among the 
major British banks’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 2025-2042 
 
Mishkin F (2006), ‘How big a problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary tern and 
Ron Feldman’s Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, XLIV, December, 988-1004 
 
Panetta F, Angelini P, Albertazzi U, Columba F, Cornacchia W, Di Ceasare A, Pilati 
A, Salleo C and Santini G (2009), ‘Financial sector pro-cyclicality: Lessons from the 
crisis’, Banca D’Italia  Questioni di Economia e Finanza, Occasional paper 44 
 
Phillipon T and Reshef A (2009), ‘Wages and human capital in the US financial 
industry: 1909-2006, NBER Working Paper, No 14644 
 
Rogoff K (1985), ‘The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate target’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 4, 1169-89 
  
Walsh C E (1995), ‘Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers’, American Economic 
Review, 85,1, 150-167 
 
 
